1	MR. TURK: If you would, just to confirm
2	that, on page 3.8.5-8, Section 2 lists "Applicable
3	Codes, Standards, and Specifications." And it
4	indicates that the list of codes, standards, guides,
5	and specifications is compared with the list
6	referenced in Subsection Roman numeral ii.2 of this
7	SRP section.
8	If we go to Section 2.2, we see, again, a
9	statement of applicable code standards and
10	specifications, and it indicates I won't read the
11	whole thing it indicates what the codes and
12	standards are, that they're contained in Section 3.8.3
13	or Section 3.8.1 of NUREG 0800.
14	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I see those.
15	MR. TURK: And specifically with respect
16	to containment foundation, it mentions Section 3.8.1,
17	and your area of focus is foundation, correct?
18	DR. BARTLETT: It is not the structural
19	performance of the foundations. It is the soils
20	capacity to resist the foundation loadings and the
21	failure mechanisms which are overturning, sliding, and
22	bearing capacity.
23	MR. TURK: In addition to referencing the
24	standards and codes that would be applicable, if an
25	applicant follows Section 3.8.5, the document also

1	establishes the loads and load combinations that must
2	be considered, and that appears in Section 3 on page
3	3.8.5-6 of Section 3.8.5, Staff Exhibit EE.
4	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct.
5	MR. TURK: Now I think you testified to
6	this before, but it has been so long, it might have
7	been another witness. We were directed specifically
8	to the next page, 3.8.5-7
9	DR. BARTLETT: That's correct.
10	MR. TURK: where there is a factor of
11	safety of 1.1 for sliding?
12	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
13	MR. TURK: And we established which load
14	combination that was, do you recall?
15	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I believe it's C as in
16	"cat."
17	MR. TURK: On page 3.8.5-6, load condition
18	C is defined as D plus H plus E prime.
19	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I see that.
20	MR. TURK: And in order to understand what
21	those are, I think we have to turn to Regulatory Guide
22	3.8.4, correct?
23	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct.
24	MR. TURK: I would ask to have a document
25	distributed at this time and ask to have it marked for

1	identification as Staff Exhibit 64. And what I am
2	distributing is Section 3.8.4 of NUREG 0800.
3	[Whereupon, the above-referred-
4	to document was marked as Staff
5	Exhibit 64 for identification.]
6	MR. TURK: In fact, this is Section 3.8.4
7	of NUREG 0800?
8	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct.
9	MR. TURK: Okay, let's just, first of all,
10	identify the load combination that is described here.
11	There's a definition of acronyms and nomenclature at
12	pages 3.8.4-7, continuing onto the next page.
13	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I'm there.
14	MR. TURK: Okay, and for this Category C,
15	load combination, capital letter "D" is defined as
16	"deadloads or their related internal moments and
17	forces, including any permanent equipment load"?
18	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct.
19	MR. TURK: Load H on the next page, I
20	believe let's go to E prime, first of all.
21	DR. BARTLETT: H is actually defined back
22	in 3.8.5 on page 6. H is the lateral earth pressure
23	load.
24	MR. TURK: And where are you reading that?
25	DR. BARTLETT: On 3.8.5-6

1	MR. TURK: Okay.
2	DR. BARTLETT: Subsection 3, "Load and
3	Load Combinations."
4	MR. TURK: Just after that listing
5	DR. BARTLETT: Just after the listing of
6	the different classes. You see in the first line
7	there it says H is the lateral earth pressure.
8	MR. TURK: Okay. And then E Prime is not
9	defined in Section 3.8.5, but it does appear in 3.8.4.
10	And it's defined in that document at page 8 as "loads
11	generated by the safe-shutdown earthquake."
12	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct.
13	MR. TURK: Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Where are you all
15	getting 3.8.5 from?
16	MR. TURK: 3.8.5 is a Staff exhibit, which
17	is Staff Exhibit EE. The section of the Regulatory
18	Guidance is entitled, "Foundations."
19	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
20	MR. TURK: In essence, Your Honor, this
21	document, 3.8.5 refers back to 3.8.4.
22	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
23	MR. TURK: Before going any further and so
24	that I don't forget, I'd ask to have Staff Exhibit 64
25	admitted into evidence.

1	MS. NAKAHARA: No objection, Your Honor.
2	MR. GAUKLER: No objection.
3	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Staff 64
4	will be admitted.
5	(Whereupon, Staff Exhibit 64
6	admitted in evidence.)
7	MR. TURK: Thank you, Your Honor.
8	In essence then, an Applicant that follows
9	Section 3.8.5 would also be designing to the
10	requirements as described in Section 3.8.4 of NUREG
11	0800. Is that consistent with your understanding?
12	DR. BARTLETT: Yes. You'd need to rely on
13	section of 3.8.4 to determine the loading conditions.
14	MR. TURK: And also in Section 3.8.4,
15	there is a description right after the definition of
16	terms in Section B, on page 3.8.4-9, which is
17	indicated to be, "Load Combinations for Concrete
18	Structures."
19	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
20	MR. TURK: And it indicates that an
21	Applicant using one of various means of calculation
22	should include various factors in its calculation in
23	order to meet the intent of the Regulatory Guide.
24	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, for the structural
25	design of the foundations. That's correct.

1 MR. TURK: Okay. Also, if you would, look at page 3.8.4-12, Section 4, "Design and Analysis 2 states, "The design 3 Procedures", and analysis 4 procedures utilized for Category 1 structures, 5 including assumptions on boundary conditions and 6 expected behavior under loads are acceptable if found 7 in accordance with the following." Do you see that 8 statement? 9 DR. BARTLETT: Yes. And then it indicates -- the 10 MR. TURK: very first element states for concrete structures, the 11 12 procedures are in accordance with ACI-349, entitled, 13 Requirements for Nuclear Safety 14 Structures." So that, in essence -- that ACI standard 15 is incorporated here as part of the design analysis and procedures to be used in designing concrete 16 17 structures. 18 DR. BARTLETT: That is correct. MR. TURK: Category 1 concrete structures. 19 20 DR. BARTLETT: Structural design, yes. The question that I 21 MR. TURK: Okay. ultimately want to get to with all of this is if an 22 23 Applicant follows the various design codes, standards, 24 and methods of analysis that are specified Regulatory Guidance, then no matter what the design 25

1	earthquake is specified to be, for that earthquake
2	they would be following guidance that has margins
3	built in, as you've testified before, that the
4	guidance would contain margins.
5	DR. BARTLETT: That is not correct.
6	MR. TURK: Well, let's ignore the
7	earthquake, specifically which earthquake they're
8	designing for.
9	DR. BARTLETT: You cannot
10	MR. TURK: I'm asking about the methods of
11	analysis, and codes, and standards.
12	DR. BARTLETT: You can
13	MR. TURK: Those apply regardless of what
14	the earthquake level is, don't they?
15	DR. BARTLETT: You cannot. What you've
16	presented me is the structural design of the
17	foundation system. There are other failure mechanisms
18	that one has to consider beyond the structural design
19	of the system. Those are what we would term "global
20	failure mechanisms", which have nothing to do with the
21	structural design of the system, but has something to
22	do with the soil and its capacity to resist failure
23	mechanisms. Those are overturning and sliding. Those
24	particular failure mechanisms, 3.8.5 specifies that

you must have a factor of safety 1.1 or greater for

T	those mechanisms of failure. And in calculating that
2	factor of safety of 1.1, you would use the demand
3	placed on the system by a safe-shutdown earthquake.
4	MR. TURK: Okay. If we follow that
5	approach, recognizing that these standards apply to a
6	deterministic earthquake. Correct?
7	DR. BARTLETT: Yes. Deterministic, 84 th
8	percentile, I believe.
9	MR. TURK: At what point would you then
10	scale down to account for the difference between a PC-
11	4 and a PC-3 facility?
12	DR. BARTLETT: You don't scale factors of
13	safety.
14	MR. TURK: That's not what I'm asking you.
15	You would hold under your analysis, if one follows
16	these Regulatory Guidance documents, you would be
17	designing to a deterministic earthquake, which
18	DR. BARTLETT: Correct. And calculating
19	a factor of safety.
20	MR. TURK: Which, hypothetically, let's
21	say is equivalent to about a 10,000 year earthquake,
22	DR. BARTLETT: That's correct.
23	MR. TURK: Hypothetically only. At what
24	point would you say to PFS, that's the design. Now
25	scale down to a PC-3 level. How would you do that?

1	DR. BARTLETT: You can't scale a factor of
2	safety.
3	MR. TURK: I'm not asking you to scale a
4	factor of safety. I'm asking you to scale the
5	earthquake.
6	DR. BARTLETT: The proper way of doing it
7	is setting a performance goal. For a PC-3, it would
8	be one times ten to the minus fourth or less
9	probability of failure, and the combination of the
10	design-basis earthquake and the risk reduction ratios,
11	you must demonstrate that you have a probability of
12	failure of one times ten to the minus four or less.
13	MR. TURK: Okay. That's the approach you
14	would follow.
15	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
16	MR. TURK: Okay. Let me ask you one more
17	question about NUREG I'm sorry. I'm starting to
18	call DOE documents by NRC names. DOE Standard 1020,
19	if a PC-3 facility was to be constructed in accordance
20	with the DOE Standard, which we understand now to be
21	four times ten to the minus four, applying to that a
22	0.9 scaling factor, is it your
23	DR. BARTLETT: One point five times 0.9.
24	MR. TURK: Yes. Well, in all cases it's
25	the 1.5.

1 DR. BARTLETT: Yes, that's correct. 2 MR. TURK: Okay. If a DOE facility was built in a manner that did not meet that standard but 3 exceed -- in other words -- I'm sorry, that failed to 4 5 meet that standard, which would mean that it --6 DR. BARTLETT: Failed to 7 performance goal. That would involve the 8 MR. TURK: Yes. 9 potential, or that could result in the potential 10 release of radioactive materials. DR. BARTLETT: No. The definition would 11 12 be that there would be potential failure of the 13 structure system and component to meet its safety 14 related function. 15 MR. TURK: Judge Farrar asked you a question, I believe, earlier today as to -- I could be 16 wrong. It might have been one of the other judges. 17 It had to do with where Dr. Bartlett would set the 18 19 appropriate return period. I thought it was Judge 20 Farrar, and you indicated that you'd like to see it greater than 2,000 year return period ground motion. 21 22 You weren't sure if 2,500 would be enough. You thought it should be somewhat higher, somewhere 23 24 between 2,500 and 10,000 years. You certainly have

indicated before that you're not testifying with

1	respect to radiation risk. Correct?
2	DR. BARTLETT: That's correct.
3	MR. TURK: And you've indicated that you
4	were not presenting testimony as a structural
5	engineer. You were not evaluating the adequacy of the
6	structure to withstand any particular earthquake.
7	Correct?
8	DR. BARTLETT: No. I'm just evaluating
9	the response of the foundations and the casks in tip-
10	over.
11	MR. TURK: So when you provided your
12	estimate of what you considered an appropriate return
13	period to be, you were not basing that upon a
14	radiological risk consideration, or a consideration as
15	to the structural consequences of sliding or cask tip-
16	over.
17	DR. BARTLETT: No, it was just an opinion.
18	Many of these decisions are difficult to make, and
19	normally designer doesn't get the luxury of setting
20	the design-basis earthquake. It's prescribed by
21	regulations, and so it's a question that catches me a
22	little off-guard.
23	MR. TURK: You also indicated in response
24	to Judge Kline that you believe the Staff had not
25	studied the consequences of cask tip-over. Do you

recall making that statement? 1 2 DR. BARTLETT: That the Staff hasn't 3 evaluated the consequences of cask tip-over? Well, I wrote down that you 4 MR. TURK: stated, "The Staff had not studied the consequence of 5 6 cask tip-over." You were talking about Mr. Guttmann's 7 testimony. 8 DR. BARTLETT: No, I think what I was 9 trying to say, and this may be -- this is some time 10 back when I heard Mr. Guttmann speak about cask tip-11 over versus not, and I think it was in lines with discussion of NUREG 15-36, which says as an acceptance 12 13 criteria that the casks should not collide or tipover. NRC's position was that that condition had been 14 15 met by this Applicant, and that they hadn't received 16 an application by this Applicant, or any other 17 Applicant that had suggested that tip-over did not have to be met, and based their decision solely on 18 19 radiological consequences. They hadn't seen that case 20 yet, so that's my understanding of Mr. Guttmann's 21 testimony. 22 MR. TURK: Okay. I won't debate that 23 because I don't recall the testimony

specifically. I know that if I tried to debate with

a witness, I wouldn't be allowed to do that. But

24

1 you're aware, are you not, that Holtec has performed a hypothetical cask tip-over analysis? 2 3 DR. BARTLETT: Yes. I've reviewed part of 4 those calculations. 5 MR. TURK: Okay. And you're aware that 6 their conclusion is that there would be no breach of 7 confinement in the event of a cask tip-over, or are you not aware of that? 8 9 DR. BARTLETT: It's been a while, Mr. 10 I'm not sure about the conclusions. I do remember the cask tip-over analysis had a maximum 11 deceleration of 45g values. Their calculation showed 12 13 they were slightly under that. And whether they 14 inferred being under that then meant that they didn't have any significant cracking of the cask, I just 15 don't remember those details. But I do remember the 16 45q deceleration criterion. 17 18 MR. TURK: You don't recall at this point 19 whether or not radiation release was part of that analysis or a reason why the analysis was performed. 20 DR. BARTLETT: I understand that it was to 21 show that the decelerations were below a certain 22 limit, and they looked at two scenarios. 23 remember the discussions of the consequences, if they 24 exceed a 45g deceleration in the drop or tip-over 25

Whether they felt that there would be 1 analysis. 2 breach at that point or not. MR. TURK: Okay. Also, you indicated at 3 some point your belief that there would be an angular, 4 5 an initial angular velocity in excess of zero if there was to be a cask tip-over. 6 7 DR. BARTLETT: Yes. 8 MR. TURK: You also indicated that you're 9 not appearing here as a structural engineer. 10 therefore, I assume you're relying on the testimony of other witnesses who have addressed the point. 11 12 DR. BARTLETT: Well, I know it's very 13 simple. I don't need other experts to make that 14 analysis. The tip-over analysis assumes that the cask is perched on its edge, incipient tip-over, and has no 15 16 angular velocity, so it just simply tips over. During 17 an earthquake, things are rocking back and forth, and if you reach a tip-over condition, you have certainly 18 19 an angular velocity. That's just fundamental to me. 20 It's rocking back and forth. It'll eventually tip-21 over and it will have an angular velocity associated with it that's higher than the condition that Holtec 22 23 analyzed. That surprises me because my 24 MR. TURK: understanding of the physics of the situation would be 25

that you may have an angular velocity up to the point 1 2 where you reach that fulcrum, but at the fulcrum point where it's about to tip-over, which you describe as 3 4 incipient tipping, you're at zero. Then velocity increases from zero. 5 6 DR. BARTLETT: No. 7 MR. TURK: That's not your understanding? DR. BARTLETT: Say you reach it at this 8 9 You cycle back this way. Maybe you don't tip-10 over. You come back through it again with an extra inertial force and velocity. You can go passed that 11 tip-over point with some velocity that's not zero. 12 There will be an angular velocity higher than what 13 14 Holtec calculated if we rock back and forth, and then 15 tip, versus just reaching this position and stopping, 16 and then tipping. CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Or, Dr. Bartlett, if you 17 read -- and let the record reflect you were tipping a 18 19 styrofoam cup back and forth. If you reach the tipover point and don't tip, then you've got 20 21 velocity there before you start --DR. BARTLETT: There is a moment that you 22 would stop and you have zero velocity. Then the next 23 24 pulse would drive you back the other direction. 25 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Right. So --

1	DR. BARTLETT: And you could tip-over in
2	the next cycle with some velocity that's beyond zero.
3	That's what may happen.
4	MR. TURK: And where is the center of
5	gravity in this demonstration you just made?
6	DR. BARTLETT: I think it would perched
7	right at the edge of the cask, or its contact point.
8	If it went beyond that outside edge, then you would
9	have a condition that would lead to tip-over.
10	MR. TURK: Have you done any calculations
11	or analysis to support that view?
12	DR. BARTLETT: Oh, I thought about it. I
13	can easily see a scenario where a cask could tip-over
14	with higher angular velocity than what was assumed in
15	the calculation.
16	MR. TURK: You, yourself, have not done
17	any calculations or analysis?
18	DR. BARTLETT: Not on tip-over, no. We
19	also forgot about the case of one cask impacting
20	another cask, and knocking an adjacent cask over.
21	That could cause a higher angular velocity too.
22	MR. TURK: And, by the way, the issue that
23	you just addressed, that's part of Part B of the
24	Contention. Correct? It goes to the analyses.
25	DR. BARTLETT: I think Dr. Kahn did some

1	angular velocity calculations in his report, and
2	concluded there was high enough velocities for tip-
3	over.
4	MR. TURK: And are you relying on Dr.
5	Kahn's analyses in making your statements here today?
6	DR. BARTLETT: No. I'm putting forth the
7	point that if cask tip-over does occur, that the
8	condition would not be bounded by the Holtec analysis,
9	because there would be a non-zero angular momentum
10	where the center of gravity reached the edge of the
11	cask, so there could be a condition more severe than
12	what Holtec analyzed for, if tip-over was to occur
13	during an earthquake.
14	MR. TURK: And in order if I understand
15	the physics again, in order to reach the conclusion
16	that you reached, you would have to have a ground
17	motion that's so significant, as to essentially propel
18	the cask over
19	DR. BARTLETT: Rock the casks.
20	MR. TURK: Not just rock it, but rock it
21	to such an extent that the velocity is sufficient to
22	thrust the cask over the fulcrum, essentially, and
23	then to collapse.
24	DR. BARTLETT: What's happening, let's say
25	the peak inertial force hasn't arrived yet, and we're

1	in a state of rocking. And in extreme case, let's say
2	we reach a case where we're right at incipient tip-
3	over but we don't tip. Then let's say the peak
4	inertial forces hit, and they're going in the other
5	direction. Now as you rock back through, you've
6	picked up angular momentum in addition to the inertial
7	force, so you'll rock through and tip-over at a higher
8	angular velocity than what Holtec would have
9	calculated.
10	MR. TURK: A small amount of rocking
11	wouldn't have that conclusion. Correct?
12	DR. BARTLETT: If we don't reach this near
13	incipient tip-over condition in the rocking back and
14	forth, yes. It would not cause tip-over, but if we
15	reach a case where we're at incipient tip-over, the
16	earthquake could cause angular velocities that are
17	higher than what Holtec used in their analysis.
18	MR. TURK: Could you turn to answer 24 of
19	your testimony.
20	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Mr. Turk, while he's
21	doing that, you had indicated that after about an hour
22	or so you might have an idea.
23	MR. TURK: I'm at Item 22 on my cross
24	plan, Your Honor. And I would estimate no more than
25	half an hour, if that much.

1 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. MR. TURK: Do you have your testimony 2 there? 3 DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I do. 4 5 MR. TURK: There is a discussion of dose 6 consequences at the bottom of page 11. And just so 7 that I'm clear, you indicate that a reduction of a storage cask's ability to shield radiation, thereby 8 causing an increase in dosage would be a failure of 9 the HI-STORM 100 cask. And you state, "Dr. Marvin 10 Resnikoff calculated an increase in radiation dose in 11 12 the event of cask tip-over." You're not making any statements of your own concerning radiation. You're 13 simply reciting Dr. Resnikoff's conclusion there? 14 DR. BARTLETT: Yes. And the belief that 15 what constitutes failure here is an increase in 16 17 radiation dose from a tip-over event. 18 MR. TURK: In answer 27 you compare -- as I understand your testimony, you compare the NRC 19 Standard Review Plan design standards with the DOE 20 1020 Standard. Do you see the very first paragraph of 21 your answer? You state that, "PFS claims the NRC SRPs 22 have equivalent or greater risk reduction ratios as 23 those stated in DOE Standard 1020-94 for performance 24 Category 3 and 4 facilities." And then you go on to 25

	contest that with what you describe as PFS' position
2	in the balance of your answer, as I understand it.
3	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
4	MR. TURK: Were you attempting to make any
5	kind of a direct correlation between specific design
6	standards in the NRC Regulatory Guidance, with those
7	of the DOE guidance, or is this just a general
8	philosophy approach?
9	DR. BARTLETT: No, I wouldn't try to make
10	any conclusions between the DOE standards and NRC
11	standards. I think the first part of this is just in
12	response, that if NRC Standard Review Plans have been
13	used for design of the ISFSI, then it has protection.
14	MR. TURK: Equal protection with the DOE
15	standard protection?
16	DR. BARTLETT: There was a concern here
17	that for ISFSIs, in particular, the governing NUREGS
18	are not the SRPs for nuclear power plants, but those
19	for ISFSIs, and whether the NUREG 1536 and 1567 have
20	the same margins and design conservatisms as the SRPs
21	for nuclear power plants.
22	MR. TURK: You haven't done a detailed
23	comparison of them in order to take a position one way
24	or the other, do you, or have you?
25	DR. BARTLETT: No, I haven't. Just

1	expressing a concern that maybe some of the
2	conservatism, because of some of the conservatism
3	may be less for ISFSIs versus nuclear power plants.
4	MR. TURK: Can you point to anything
5	specifically when you make that statement?
6	DR. BARTLETT: Well, we talked a little
7	bit about, again, the factor of safety. If one adopts
8	a factor of safety of 1.1 for the design of an ISFSI
9	against global foundation failure, such as bearing
10	capacity, overturning or sliding, that doesn't
11	guarantee the same margins as if one was to design a
12	nuclear power plant foundation for the safe-shutdown
13	earthquake.
14	MR. TURK: And that's because the design
15	earthquake in the formula, i.e., the demand side, is
16	different.
17	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct, so your
18	real margins are different.
19	MR. TURK: And that's the only concern
20	you've identified at this time with respect to the
21	potential for ISFSI Regulatory Guidance to be less
22	conservative than Regulatory Guidance for a nuclear
23	power plant.
24	DR. BARTLETT: That's one of the main
25	ones. Let me see if there's anything else here I'm

1	trying to capture. Other than also, that the Reg
2	Guides developed for ISFSIs are not, I think, as
3	specific as they are for nuclear power plants, and not
4	fleshed out in the regulatory framework as much as the
5	nuclear power plants have been, so I think it's
6	somewhat a work in process, at least, the design
7	criterion and codes that govern for ISFSIs.
8	MR. TURK: Prior to your involvement in
9	this proceeding, had you ever had occasion to read any
10	Regulatory Guidance for ISFSIs?
11	DR. BARTLETT: No, I had not.
12	MR. TURK: And when you describe the
13	Regulatory Guidance for ISFSIs, you're aware, are you
14	not, that they're published by the same regulatory
15	body, i.e., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as is
16	the Regulatory Guidance for nuclear power reactors?
17	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct.
18	MR. TURK: Have you read NUREG 1536 in
19	detail?
20	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I think I have. At
21	least, it may have been some time ago, but I think I
22	read it in its entirety.
23	MR. TURK: And have you read 1567?
24	DR. BARTLETT: I don't believe I have all
25	of 1567 in its entirety. I was mainly looking at its

applicable codes and standards for foundation and cask 1 2 design. 3 MR. TURK: Do you recall 1567, which codes and standards it references? 4 5 DR. BARTLETT: I do not. MR. TURK: In fact, it references the same 6 7 American Concrete Institute Standard 349, that the 8 Regulatory Guidance for nuclear power plants 9 references, doesn't it, or do you not know? 10 I could verify that, but DR. BARTLETT: 11 I'll take your characterization as being accurate. 12 But again, the focus of my review has not been on the 13 structural design of the foundation systems. been looking at the global failure mechanisms, and in 14 15 those cases, we don't have really developed criteria, except for a factor of safety. 16 17 MR. TURK: In answer 15, as I read that 18 answer, and please correct me if I'm wrong, but to me it reads like a legal brief. It cites different 19 20 responses to Summary Disposition Motions. different regulatory documents. It cites responses to 21 22 discovery. It cites the Exemption Request. If I was 23 a lawyer, I would write a paragraph or I would write an answer like that. 24 Is that --25 DR. BARTLETT: I have some good people

1	looking over my shoulder.
2	MR. TURK: Were they looking over your
3	shoulder, or was it vice versa?
4	DR. BARTLETT: I don't really recall, Mr.
5	Turk.
6	MR. TURK: Do you know off-hand whether
7	that answer was written by one of the counsel for the
8	State, rather than by yourself?
9	DR. BARTLETT: Could you refer me to
10	MR. TURK: Answer 15.
11	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Wait a minute. I would
12	operate under the assumption that every piece of
13	direct testimony that's been submitted to us has not
14	been exclusively authored by the scientist who wrote
15	it. Different answers may be a matter of degree.
16	Every one of these witnesses has taken the stand and
17	said that it was written under his direction or
18	supervision, and he subscribed to it, so why are we
19	going to look into who why are we going to look
20	into this in this particular instance on the eighth
21	week of the trial?
22	MR. TURK: The next question will
23	elucidate. I certainly agree with Your Honor. It
24	doesn't matter who writes it. If the witness reads
25	it, and agrees with it, and adopts it, it becomes his

1	testimony.
2	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Ask him that.
3	MR. TURK: I'm satisfied that he's done
4	that already. He's adopted the testimony.
5	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Then why do you
6	want to know then what was the purpose of the
7	question that aroused me?
8	MR. TURK: I'd ask the witness to turn,
9	and this is the next question I would ask, Your Honor.
10	If you turn to answer 27 would you allow me to get
11	an answer to the question, Your Honor?
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Not unless you give me
13	a really good reason.
14	MR. TURK: Well, I want to understand
15	whether certain statements that appear in this
16	testimony were based on his knowledge, or on
17	representations by counsel.
18	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: And suppose we got an
19	answer to that that was to your liking, what would
20	that accomplish? Suppose he put something in an
21	answer that counsel represented was true, I mean, now
22	we're going to get into work product. We're going to
23	get into a whole lot of stuff we don't want to get
24	into.

MR. TURK: I withdraw that question.

1	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Thank you.
2	MR. TURK: Would you look at answer 27,
3	please. On page 13, there's a large paragraph
4	starting about halfway down the page, in which you
5	discuss NRC Regulatory Guidance and NUREG 1536 and
6	NUREG 1567.
7	DR. BARTLETT: Correct.
8	MR. TURK: Did you provide those
9	statements? Are they based on your knowledge?
10	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I think so. Well,
11	they're discussions I think we had as a team, and this
12	may go back into response to Summary Disposition by
13	the State to PFS back last fall. But whether the same
14	levels of conservatisms in nuclear power plants in
15	their design was then transferred into NUREG 1536 and
16	1567, so I guess I do recall the discussions that we
17	had at the time of the Summary Disposition about this.
18	MR. TURK: Let me come to the ACI
19	Standard. Do you have NUREG 1567 in front of you?
20	DR. BARTLETT: I have pieces of it.
21	MR. TURK: Which pieces are you familiar
22	with in 1567?
23	DR. BARTLETT: I guess I could respond,
24	the pieces that I have.
25	MR. TURK: Okay. It is a document that's

1	about one inch thick, double-sided?
2	DR. BARTLETT: That is correct. And I
3	think my review is limited to the foundations part of
4	that.
5	MR. GAUKLER: Dr. Bartlett, I have a
6	complete copy of 1567 if you want it.
7	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I might be able to
8	recognize the parts that I looked at just from the
9	full copy. I thought I had it in this set of
10	regulatory documents that I have, but I'm not seeing
11	it immediately.
12	MR. TRAVIESO-DIAZ: Mr. Chairman, I don't
13	want to interrupt cross examination, but in the
14	interest of efficiency, could this be a good time to
15	take a break so the witness can review the document?
16	DR. BARTLETT: I found it.
17	MR. TURK: I'm just about done. It might
18	be better that we finish.
19	MR. TRAVIESO-DIAZ: Okay.
20	DR. BARTLETT: Mr. Turk, my review of
21	1567, at least what was provided to me was pages 2-10,
22	7-20, and 7-54.
23	MR. TURK: Those are the three pages in
24	the document that you reviewed?
25	DR. BARTLETT: Yes. Again, my review is

1	limited to earthquakes and foundation design.
2	MR. TURK: And on the basis of your review
3	of those three pages, you reached the conclusion that
4	the SRP in NUREG 1567, "May already incorporate less
5	conservatism than nuclear power plant SRPs."
6	DR. BARTLETT: I would say on my review,
7	and then again, discussions that we had as a team
8	during response to Summary Disposition.
9	MR. TURK: In answer 27 also, that same
10	paragraph on page 13, you discuss what you represent
11	as, "NRC Staff and PFS claimed that potential
12	consequences of seismic failure of ISFSIs are much
13	less severe than those of nuclear power plants." Do
14	you see that statement?
15	DR. BARTLETT: That was on page?
16	MR. TURK: Page 13 of your testimony. The
17	third full paragraph on the page.
18	DR. BARTLETT: Yes, I find that's the
19	beginning sentence of that paragraph.
20	MR. TURK: Okay. As I understand your
21	testimony today, you're not holding yourself out as an
22	expert with respect to what are the consequences of a
23	breach of confinement in an ISFSI or radiological
24	release at a nuclear power plant. You're not here as
25	an expert on the relative risk of the two types of

1	facilities.
2	DR. BARTLETT: No, that's not my area of
3	expertise.
4	MR. TURK: I just have a few more items.
5	I'm at number 27, Your Honor.
6	In that same paragraph, you make a
7	specific reference to NUREG 1567 at 7-20 and 7-54?
8	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
9	MR. TURK: Could you explain what those
10	references are? If you have the NUREG document in
11	front of you, do you have NUREG 1567?
12	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
13	MR. TURK: Would you agree that those
14	pages don't exist?
15	DR. BARTLETT: See 7-20 and 7-54 of 1567?
16	MR. TURK: That's what your testimony
17	states.
18	DR. BARTLETT: I'm confused because they
19	exist in what I have.
20	MR. TURK: In what you have in front of
21	you?
22	DR. BARTLETT: Yes.
23	MS. NAKAHARA: Dr. Bartlett, will you
24	clarify what document you're looking at?
25	DR. BARTLETT: NUREG 1567.

1	MS. NAKAHARA: Is that your copy you're
2	looking at?
3	DR. BARTLETT: It is my copy.
4	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: And weren't you just
5	given a different copy, or do you have two versions in
6	front of you?
7	DR. BARTLETT: Was that taken from me?
8	Oh, no. Here it is. Excuse me.
9	MR. TURK: What is the date of the
10	document that you're looking at in which you found
11	those pages?
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Not the one that
13	DR. BARTLETT: This may be part of the
14	problem. The document I've been using is a draft
15	report for comment. What I've been handed is a final
16	report, so there was a revision from a draft to a
17	final version. So I when we referenced this
18	document, we should have referenced it as draft.
19	MR. TURK: And which draft are you looking
20	at?
21	DR. BARTLETT: It's just labeled, "Draft
22	for Comment."
23	MR. TURK: It may be, Your Honor, I just
24	have a bit more. Would this perhaps be a good time to
25	break, and I would ask if I may look at Dr. Bartlett's

copy of the draft to see what the reference was. 1 2 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Very well. 3 Perhaps, if the State could MR. TURK: 4 point me to the sentence, that would speed things up. 5 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Why don't 6 you all work that out, and then we can just stipulate 7 what happened, rather than go round and round on it. All right. Then this is a good time for a break. 8 9 (Off the record 2:44:42 - 3:02:41 p.m.) CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Back on the record. 10 11 MR. TURK: Thank you, Your Honor. As the 12 day gets longer, we all have more papers on our desks. CHAIRMAN FARRAR: That reminds me of two 13 14 Next week the people who were worried about 15 Yucca Mountain Electronics are going to be in here watching us do aircraft as kind of a case study to see 16 how they need to set up the electronic filing and 17 paperless system we're supposed to have at Yucca 18 19 Mountain. Also in case I forget, tomorrow morning 20 apparently there's some major public meeting at the 21 Commission that starts at 8:30 a.m. People will be 22 arriving as early as 7:30 a.m. So you can come in 23 after 8:30 a.m. and hope everyone who is supposed to 24

be here is here and has cleared security, or you can

1	come in earlier and eat at the cafeteria. Mr.
2	Delligatti, do you have a suggestion?
3	MR. DELLIGATTI: (Away from microphone.)
4	Yes. Actually it was Mr that suggested you might
5	also consider coming in Building One rather than
6	Building Two because
7	(Discussion off the microphone.)
8	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Inside. You go into the
9	tall building closer to the Metro Station and check in
10	there. Then there's a glass enclosed above-ground
11	tunnel that takes you over to here.
12	(Discussion off the microphone.)
13	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Although they seem to
14	have less of a staff.
15	MR. DELLIGATTI: (Away from microphone.)
16	It would probably be a good idea to have contact
17	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Yes.
18	(Discussion off the microphone.)
19	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right.
20	MR. TURK: Maybe if we proceed with Dr.
21	Cornell this afternoon, we can take a late start
22	tomorrow. I guess we'll see.
23	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Let's see how far we
24	get.
25	MR. TURK: I am ready to go. Are we on

1	the record?
2	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Yes.
3	CROSS EXAMINATION (cont.)
4	BY MR. TURK:
5	Q Dr. Bartlett, the last question I asked
6	you had to do with a reference in your testimony, the
7	NUREG 1567 that you cite on page 13 of your testimony,
8	that document at pages 7-20 and 7-54. I believe you
9	indicated before we broke that it was the draft
10	version of NUREG 1567.
11	A That is correct.
12	Q You were kind enough to give me a copy of
13	the pages, 7-20 and 7-54, to which you referred in the
14	draft document.
15	A That is correct.
16	Q In citing that document, you indicate that
17	under the Standard Review Plan 1567 there's an
18	assumption that the design earthquake is equivalent to
19	a safe shut down or deterministic earthquake used for
20	nuclear facilities under 10 CFR Part 50. That's your
21	reason for citing that statement in the draft guidance
22	document. Correct?
23	A That was found on page 7-54, correct.
24	Q You recognize that here PFS is applying
25	for an exemption from the requirement of they follow

	the deterministic approach in order to enable them to
2	use the probablistic seismic hazard analysis that
3	they've performed to establish the design earthquake.
4	Is that correct?
5	A Yes. That's my understanding of them
6	applying for an exemption.
7	Q Nonetheless, without respect to the
8	exemption request, your comment is that the Standard
9	Review Plan and you say this twice in the same
10	paragraph by the way that the Standard Review Plan for
11	an ISFSI "may already incorporate less design
12	conservatism than NPP SRPs." In other words, less
13	design conservatism than a nuclear power plant
14	Standard Review Plan. Where in what you just referred
15	me to in NUREG 1567 do you reach that or do you have
16	a basis to reach that conclusion?
17	A We've talked at length about factor of
18	safety and the design criterion for the factor of
19	safety. I think that would be one instance.
20	Q I don't understand. Factor of safety,
21	that had to do with a proposal by PFS to reduce the
22	seismic demand from the deterministic earthquake.
23	Correct?
24	A Yes. Right. And use a factor of safety
25	of 1.1 for the exemption earthquake.

1	Q Right. But you're not stating in this
2	paragraph that the exemption is less conservative or
3	would establish a less conservative value than the
4	deterministic earthquake. You're stating that NRC
5	guidance documents which you yourself just indicated
6	apply for the deterministic or safe shut down
7	earthquake is less conservative than the nuclear power
8	plant's safe shut down earthquake regulatory guidance.
9	I don't see that connection.
10	A I guess I'm putting forth the idea that if
11	one was to design according to nuclear power plant
12	guidance that the factor of safety for overturning
13	bearing capacity and sliding would be based on a safe
14	shut down earthquake.
15	Q Yes.
16	A If one was to design for an earthquake
17	that's been granted due to an exemption and designed
18	to the same factor of safety 1.1, then in real terms
19	the margins have been decreased.
20	Q Okay.
21	A Does that help?
22	Q It does help. But I think that you need
23	to correct your testimony in light of that statement.
24	A It may be unclear.
25	Q Twice in that same paragraph, halfway down

page 13, you state not that the exemption request 1 2 establishes a less conservative licensing basis, but 3 rather that the Standard Review Plans in 1567 and 1536 4 establish a less conservative design basis than 5 regulatory guidance for nuclear power plants. That's not a correct statement. Is it? 6 7 I think the intent as I Α I'm not sure. recall when this was written was that there's an 8 9 argument put forth that ISFSIs inherently pose a less 10 hazard than nuclear power plants because of their complete difference in operations. If one adopts that 11 12 philosophy, then there may be a relaxing of the reg guides and not holding them to the same level of 13 14 conservatism to a nuclear power plant just because that ISFSIs are inherently less dangerous. Does that 15 16 help? 17 Q No. The reason is when you talk about an ISFSI being inherently less dangerous, you're now 18 addressing the probablistic approach and the thought 19 that because an ISFSI is inherently less dangerous, 20 they need not design to the safe shut down earthquake 21 for a nuclear power plant. Right? 22 On the demand side, that would be 23 Α Yes. 24 correct. All right. But that's not a failure or a 25 0

1	lack of conservatism in the regulatory guidance. That
2	rather would apply to using a probablistic approach
3	and designing for an earthquake less than that which
4	is stated to be needed in the regulatory guidance for
5	ISFSIs. Correct?
6	A Again, I guess I'm saying there's very
7	little guidance.
8	Q Let's look at the citation that you give
9	us in your testimony.
10	A There's very little guidance about design
11	of foundation systems.
12	Q I think it's just a simple error in the
13	writing of the testimony. Let's look at your
14	citations and make that very clear. You cite page 2-
15	10 of NUREG 1536. The discussion of earthquakes on
16	that page states that "the SAR should state the
17	parameters of the design basis earthquake for ISFSIs
18	at reactor sites. This is equivalent to the SSE used
19	for analysis of nuclear facilities under 10 CFR Part
20	50." Right?
21	A Yes.
22	Q So that states if the generic COC is
23	issued for a dry cask storage system which is what
24	NUREG 1536 addresses, then the design basis earthquake
25	for the reactor would be the applicable design

1.	earthquake. Right?
2	A That's correct.
3	Q That's not less conservative than the
4	regulatory guidance for reactors. Right?
5	A That would not be.
6	Q All right. Then you cite the NUREG 1567.
7	Here you're citing to the draft document which I have
8	no problem with. At page 7-20 of that draft document,
9	the following statement appears. "The design
10	earthquake shall be not less than that required for
11	the site by 10 CFR 72.102." Do you see that
12	statement?
13	A Yes.
14	Q And that's what you're referring to in
15	your testimony. Correct?
16	A Yes.
17	Q 72.102 establishes that a design
18	earthquake for an ISFSI shall be equivalent to the
19	safe shut down earthquake for nuclear power plants.
20	Correct?
21	A That's correct.
22	Q So this guidance in NUREG 1567 draft
23	document is not less conservative than the regulatory
24	guidance for a nuclear power plant.
25	A No, that's correct.

	12938
1	Q Then you also cite page 7-54 of the draft
2	document. On that page in discussing earthquake
3	loads, there are two citations of sources. Do you see
4	the citation as ANSI 57.9 and ACI 349?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Those same sources apply to an ISFSI as
7	apply to nuclear power plants. Correct? This
8	document establishes that those sources or those
9	references apply in the regulatory review of an ISFSI
10	application. Right?
11	A Yes. That's correct.
12	Q Those same references appear in the
13	regulatory guidance for nuclear power plants. Are you
14	aware of that or shall we point to the specific
15	provisions?
16	A No. I'll take your characterization.
17	That's fine.
18	Q Okay. In the textural discussion next to
19	that discussion on page 7-54, the following statement
20	appears. "Loads do to the direct and secondary
21	effects of the design basis earthquake (DE), the DE is
22	comparable to the safe shut down earthquake used for
23	analysis of nuclear facilities under 10 CFR 50." Do
24	you see that statement?
25	A Yes. That's correct.

	12939
1	Q In fact in the copy that you handed me
2	that I photocopied, you've underlined that sentence
3	that I just read.
4	A Yes.
5	Q That's the reference that you're citing in
6	your testimony when you were discussing this page of
7	the regulatory guidance document. Correct?
8	A Yes.
9	Q So that's not any less conservative than
10	the guidance for nuclear power plants. Is it?
11	A Not for the design basis earthquake. That
12	is correct.
13	Q So is it fair to say then that in your
14	testimony when you say that the regulatory guidance
15	for ISFSIs is less conservative than the guidance for
16	nuclear power plants, you weren't thinking of this
17	regulatory guidance, but rather you were thinking of
18	the concept of using a PSHA with a design earthquake
19	somewhere less than the deterministic safe shut down
20	earthquake as the basis for licensing an ISFSI? I.e.,
21	you were thinking of the exemption request being less
22	conservative than the regulatory guidance.
23	A I think the basis of the statement is more
24	back to the concept that ISFSI facilities are less
25	vulnerable to earthquake initiated accidents than

1	nuclear power plants. There was a concern that some
2	of this idea because they're less vulnerable, the
3	nuclear power plants would there be some relaxation in
4	the reg guides which may potentially incorporate less
5	conservatism.
6	Q But you're not aware of any specific area
7	of the reg guide that does that.
8	A At this point, I haven't reviewed them in
9	detail.
10	Q So you can't point us to anything today
11	that you think is less conservative.
12	A No. But I certainly
13	Q Is that correct?
14	A Yes. After what we've reviewed today, I
15	would certainly agree that as you look at these
16	guidance at least in relation to the design basis
17	earthquake that 1536 and 1567 do point to the same
18	shut down earthquake that would be used for a nuclear
19	power plant.
20	Q Yes. And the regulation does that also.
21	Correct?
22	A Yes.
23	Q 72.102.
24	A Yes.
25	Q One last point about the regulatory

1	guidance in 1536. You state at the bottom of page 13
2	that "NUREG 1536 requires the Applicant to demonstrate
3	that the dry cask system will not tip over or drop as
4	a result of a natural phenomenon event such as an
5	earthquake." Then you cite NUREG 1536.
6	A Yes. That's correct.
7	Q Do you have NUREG 1536 there with you?
8	A I'm just checking. It shows final report.
9	So, yes I have the final version it appears.
10	Q Do you have page 3-14?
11	A I do not.
12	MR. TURK: I'd like to read a statement.
13	Perhaps I should walk over to the witness and show him
14	the document unless the State has an extra copy.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Go ahead. Do that. Why
16	don't you walk over there, Mr. Turk?
17	MR. TURK: I have two copies but before I
18	can open one up I might as well just walk over there
19	and read the sentence.
20	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Right.
21	MR. TURK: Let me indicate I'm showing Dr.
22	Bartlett a copy of NUREG 1536 entitled "Standard
23	Review Plan for dry cask storage systems."
24	BY MR. TURK:
25	Q It bears the date of January 1997.

Correct? 1 Α Yes. 2 page 3-14, I'd like to read the 0 3 sentences. "The Applicant 4 following two demonstrate that no tip over or drop will result from 5 6 an earthquake. In addition, impacts between casks 7 should either be precluded or should be considered an accident event from which the cask must be shown to be 8 to be structurally adequate." Do you see that 9 statement? 10 11 Α Yes. Is it fair to say then based on 12 0 Okay. this reading of NUREG 1536 that one option for an 13 14 Applicant which has not been proposed here to my 15 knowledge is an analysis that shows that even if casks impact there's no structural inadequacy that would 16 result from that? 17 That's my understanding of what you read. 18 Α The whole point is and maybe you can 19 0 20 confirm your understanding of this, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is concerned with the protection 21 of the public from radiological hazards. Is that your 22 understanding of the regulatory mission of the Agency 23

No. I really can't comment on the mission

or do you know?

Α

24

1	of the NRC.
2	Q You would agree though that we aren't an
3	engineering review board. We do have a function
4	that's related to radiological risk.
5	A Yes. I would assume that you would.
6	MR. TURK: Does anyone have a question
7	they want me to ask?
8	(Laughter.)
9	MR. TURK: Thank you very much, Dr.
10	Bartlett.
11	DR. BARTLETT: You're welcome.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Thank you, Mr. Turk.
13	Any redirect by the State?
14	MS. NAKAHARA: Very briefly.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: We have no more
16	questions. Do you have anything, Ms. Nakahara?
17	MS. NAKAHARA: A few question, Your Honor.
18	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Go ahead.
19	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
20	BY MS. NAKAHARA:
21	Q Dr. Bartlett, in response to questions
22	from Mr. Gaukler, you discussed your experience in
23	applying DOE Standard 1020 at Savannah River. Are you
24	familiar with the application of DOE 1020 to
25	structures from your experience at Savannah River?

25

A Well, we worked as a team. There was a structural mechanics group that was working with us in the team. So there was a lot of interplay between the foundations engineering which is being done by the Geotechnical Engineering and the structure mechanics group. So though I'm not directly responsible for that area of review, I have sat in several review meetings that discussed things related to the structural performance of the facilities.

Q In further responses to Mr. Gaukler, you stated that you're limiting your opinion to foundations and not structures. However, in your opinion, wouldn't the general application of DOE 1020 or the two-handed approach as it has been referred to in this proceeding would apply equally to structures?

Α Well, certainly. The intent of DOE Standard 1020 is actually more applicable I think to The DOE Standard 1020 when it comes to structures. foundation issues such as sliding and overturning is very brief and gives the designer some options of what can do. I think we discussed at least for foundation evaluation criteria the use of this formula that allows you to use a scale design basis earthquake at 1.5 times the scaling factor times the design basis But DOE Standard 1020 mostly applies to earthquake.

1	structural and mechanical design.
2	Q In response to a question from Mr. Gaukler
3	about your answer to question 9, you essentially
4	agreed that the answer was historical. Do you recall
5	if the Staff proffered a two-handed approach as has
6	been referenced in this proceeding using a design
7	basis earthquake with the design conservatism in their
8	justification in the SER?
9	A I don't recall any justification. The
10	Staff's review seemed to be pretty one-handed focusing
11	on the design basis earthquake. It was not until
12	testimony by Dr. Cornell that we saw the introduction
13	of this two-handed approach in using concepts that are
14	similar to DOE Standard 1020.
15	Q Finally, today you offered testimony that
16	described containment. Will you define how you view
17	containment in your responses to your questions from
18	Mr. Gaukler, Mr. Turk, and the Board?
19	A Lack of containment. I would say that
20	lack of containment would be where radiological dose
21	is increased. So if for example the cask tips over
22	and as a result of that tip over radiological dosage
23	increases, I would consider that lack of containment.
24	MS. NAKAHARA: Thank you, Dr. Bartlett.
25	I have no further questions.

1	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Thank you, Ms. Nakahara.
2	Recross?
3	MR. GAUKLER: No recross.
4	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Mr. Turk?
5	MR. TURK: Nothing, Your Honor.
6	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Then that
7	concludes Dr. Bartlett's testimony. He'll be staying
8	with you for Dr. Cornell's.
9	MS. NAKAHARA: Yes, Your Honor.
10	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: But he will not be
11	testifying again.
12	MS. NAKAHARA: Depending upon Dr.
13	Cornell's rebuttal and whether PFS has any with Dr.
14	Cornell of Dr. Bartlett.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right.
16	MS. NAKAHARA: But no, we're not planning
17	any.
18	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: On the assumption, Dr.
19	Bartlett, you will not be back on the stand, let us
20	take this opportunity. You've had a lead role in the
21	entire aspect of the entire State case on seismic
22	matters. We very much appreciate as I'm sure they and
23	the Governor do the enormous effort you've put into
24	this on behalf not only of the State but the citizens
25	of Utah. So we particularly appreciate your effort in

1	this case.
2	DR. BARTLETT: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm
3	thankful for the opportunity to express my views and
4	opinions.
5	MS. CHANCELLOR: Your Honor, could I make
6	a dangerous suggestion?
7	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Yes. We need some
8	excitement.
9	MS. CHANCELLOR: I was just chatting with
10	Mr. Gaukler. There may be a possibility we could
11	finish today.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: We had thought of that.
13	It's your option. It's recently prepared rebuttal but
14	if you're prepared to go ahead and cross on the spot,
15	then
16	MS. CHANCELLOR: We could certainly cross
17	on the written rebuttal.
18	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Then let's
19	have at it.
20	MR. GAUKLER: I'd like to take about a ten
21	minute break before rebuttal, 15 minutes at most.
22	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Everyone has the
23	prefiled Oh, you're going to do the prefiled
24	rebuttal and rebuttal
25	MR. GAUKLER: Yes.

1	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: So the rebuttal to Dr.
2	Bartlett.
3	MR. GAUKLER: Right. 15 minutes or less.
4	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. The prefiled is
5	to Dr. Arabasz. Right?
6	MR. GAUKLER: Right.
7	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Fine then it's
8	almost 3:30 p.m. Let's come back at 3:40 p.m. Or do
9	you need longer?
10	MR. GAUKLER: Let's make it 3:45 p.m.
11	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Make it 3:45 p.m. We'll
12	press along. Off the record.
13	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
14	the record at 3:29 p.m. and went back on
15	the record at 3:48 p.m.)
16	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: On the record. Mr.
17	Turk, you had wanted to make a statement.
18	MR. TURK: Yes, Your Honor. In one of my
19	last sets of questions to Dr. Bartlett, I was
20	inquiring about why the regulatory guidance for ISFSIs
21	would be less conservative than the regulatory
22	guidance for nuclear power plants.
23	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Right.
24	MR. TURK: And in that course of my
25	questioning, I referred to two documents that were

cited in the draft guidance document that Dr. Bartlett had relied on. That was the draft guidance document for NUREG 1567. One of those was ACI-349 which as earlier testimony indicated appears both in the regulatory guidance for ISFSIs and for nuclear power plants. I also suggested to Dr. Bartlett that the reference at page 7-54 of the draft NUREG 1567 which cites ANSI 57.9 also applies to nuclear power plants not just ISFSIs.

Dr. Bartlett was nice enough to accept my representation on that basis. We didn't go and look for the specific reference in the regulatory guidance. In fact when I looked at the regulatory guidance, I see there's no citation for nuclear power plants through the ANSI Standard. Then when I look at the ANSI Standard, I understood why. The ANSI Standard specifically indicates that it's applicable to ISFSIs.

The ANSI Standard by the way, we put some of those pages in previously. That's Staff Exhibit 57. So I want to make that known that my representation was incorrect. If the State has any other testimony they wish to offer on that point, I certainly wouldn't object inasmuch as it was my representation that drew the answer.

MS. NAKAHARA: No, Your Honor. We

1	appreciate the correction.
2	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Yes. Thank you, Mr.
3	Turk. We do appreciate the correction. We'll
4	reinterpret the testimony in that light. Dr. Cornell,
5	you've previously been sworn. Good to have you back.
6	Consider yourself still under oath. I think you
7	waited a long time in Salt Lake City to get back on,
8	finally got disgusted, and left which was probably a
9	good move.
10	(Laughter.)
11	DR. CORNELL: Those aren't my words.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: But we're glad to have
13	you back. Go ahead, Mr. Gaukler.
14	DIRECT EXAMINATION
15	BY MR. GAUKLER:
16	Q Dr. Cornell, do you have before you a copy
17	of rebuttal testimony of C. Allin Cornell to the
18	testimony of the State witness Dr. Walter J. Arabasz
19	on Section E of unified contention Utah L/QQ?
20	A Yes I do.
21	Q Was this rebuttal testimony prepared by
22	you or under your supervision and direction?
23	A Yes it was.
24	Q Is this testimony true and correct to the
25	best of your knowledge?

1	A Yes it is.
2	Q Do you adopt this as your sworn rebuttal
3	testimony with respect to the testimony of Walter J.
4	Arabasz in this proceeding?
5	A Yes I do.
6	MR. GAUKLER: Your Honor, I would request
7	that this rebuttal testimony of Dr. Cornell be bound
8	into the record as if read.
9	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Any objection?
10	MS. NAKAHARA: No objection, Your Honor.
11	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Staff?
12	MR. TURK: No, Your Honor.
13	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Then the
14	rebuttal testimony of Dr. Cornell dated June 27
15	responding to Dr. Arabasz will be bound into the
16	record at this point as if read.
17	(Insert prefiled testimony of Dr. Allin Cornell.)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

In the Matter of)	
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.	\frac{1}{2}	Docket No. 72-22
(Private Fuel Storage Facility))	ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF C. ALLIN CORNELL TO THE TESTIMONY OF STATE WITNESS DR. WALTER J. ARABASZ ON SECTION E OF UNIFIED CONTENTION UTAH L/OQ

- Q1. In Answers 14-15 of his pre-filed testimony, Dr. Arabasz takes issue with the position stated in paragraph 49 of your November 7, 2001 declaration that in "virtually all areas of public safety hazards are measured as annual probabilities (or frequencies) of occurrence regardless of the length of the activity in question, the exposure time, the estimated facility life, or the licensing duration." See "State of Utah Testimony of Walter J. Arabasz Regarding Unified Contention Utah L/QQ (Seismic Exemption)," April 1, 2002 ("Arabasz Direct Testimony"). According to Dr. Arabasz, many standards make use, not of annual probabilities, but of probabilities of exceedence in units such as 10%, 5% or 2% in 50 years. What is your response to Dr. Arabasz's criticism?
 - A1. Stating probabilities of exceedence in such terms as a 10% probability of exceedence in 50 years (as opposed to annual probability of exceedence of 2x10⁻³) is just a different way of presenting the frequency of occurrence. Neither method of specifying frequency is predicated on the lifetime of a facility, nor does the application of the standard vary depending on a facility's projected lifetime. This is clearly reflected in the quotation on page 15 of Dr. Arabasz's direct testimony from the National Research Council's Panel on Seismic Hazard Analysis, which directly equates a design seismic hazard level with a 10% probability of exceedence in 50 years to an annual probability of exceedence of 2x10⁻³.

Thus, for example, applying a seismic standard of 10% probability of exceedence in 50 years to two buildings, one constructed for a 10 year lifetime and the other for a 100 year lifetime, would result in the same annual probability of exceedence of $2x10^{-3}$ for each building. Therefore, the examples cited by Dr. Arabasz

confirm my basic thesis, which is that in these codes and criteria the frequency of occurrence used is (and should be) independent of the length of the lifetime of the facility or item at risk. All that his examples confirm is that different standards use different units for measuring frequency.

- Q2. In his testimony at the hearing (Tr. 10164-10170), Dr. Arabasz acknowledged the potential for logical inconsistencies that might result from adopting a design return period proportional to the duration of the facility lifetime. The two examples discussed were (1) that under a facility lifetime-dependent approach a reduction of the plant design life could lead to perhaps unreasonably reduced design return periods; and (2) that ambiguities could arise in a nuclear power plant ("NPP") re-licensing application of a plant whose original lifetime has expired. Dr. Arabasz further stated that under the DOE 1020 paradigm the lifetime-independent, annual frequency approach would be appropriate and preferable, but that lacking "the pertaining regulatory guidance... and clearly established framework for decision making" (such as that in DOE 1020) would apparently lead him in the direction of a duration-dependent safety criterion here. (Tr. 10170) Do you believe that a clearly established framework for decision making based on a lifetime-independent, annual frequency approach is lacking in the NRC arena?
 - A2. No. In my written testimony I cite several NRC documents that attest to that agency's clear adoption of annual frequency as the appropriate basis for safety criteria and a risk-informed decision-making framework. For example, both the Commission's Reactor Safety Policy Statement [(SECY 00-007), Ref. 22 of my direct testimony] at p.6 and Regulatory Guide 1.174 [Ref. 5] clearly set forth frequency-based risk acceptance guidelines for NPPs where the performance objectives are Core Damage Frequency and Early Large Release. While these statements were made in connection with the adoption of frequency-based guidelines for NPPs, the same principles apply to ISFSIs, such as the PFSF.

Another example of the logical inconsistencies that may arise from tying the frequency standard to lifetimes is in the area of worker safety. Worker safety criteria are typically are measured in terms of the "probability of death per worker lifetime" (not per annum). However, no such standard to my knowledge differentiates between a 65-year-old worker (whose remaining lifetime is likely to be short) and a younger worker. In other words, while the frequency of occurrence in this example is expressed in units "per lifetime," the standards are not applied differently depending on a person's remaining lifetime. Indeed, the use of a duration-dependent worker safety criterion would lead to implications to which many of us of the older generation would not react kindly. Compared to our younger workplace colleagues, those of us with only, say, a decade of work

ahead of us could be subjected, by the application of such a duration-dependent standard, to significantly reduced work place protection standards: lesser protection against cancer-inducing activities (e. g., working with asbestos), no shields around dangerous equipment, etc.

- Q3. In response to questions by Judge Lam (Tr. 10047-50), Dr. Arabasz agreed "emphatically" with your testimony that, in seeking to achieve an acceptable risk of failure of SSCs for ISFSIs, it was appropriate to use a "two hand approach" which took into account, on the one hand, the robustness and conservatism of the design of the SSCs and, on the other hand, the regulatory standard on hazard probability. Dr. Arabasz, however, opined that the levels of conservatism in the design of some of the SSCs for an ISFSI (such as storage casks) may not have been established to the same level of confidence as for nuclear power plant SSCs. For that reason, he suggested that the desired low level of overall risk might not be achieved unless the hazard probability was set sufficiently high. Do you agree with Dr. Arabasz's position?
 - A3. I agree with Dr. Arabasz's reasoning but not with the premise on which his position is based. Thus, I agree with Dr. Arabasz that, in assessing what seismic safety level has been achieved, one cannot depend solely on either the conservatism in the design or the mean return period of the design basis ground motion. Dr. Arabasz and I apparently agree that both of the two hands must be recognized to make informed public safety decisions. We also agree that for SSCs typical of NPPs we can have confidence that the NRC SRPs will insure very significant levels of robustness in the design; hence, the 2000 year return period will achieve the desired performance goal (i.e., an SSC failure probability of 10⁻⁴ or less) with high degree of confidence.

Further, Dr. Arabasz is correct in saying that storage casks for ISFSIs do not fall into this "NPP-typical" category, and that some further analysis is necessary to provide confidence that the desired performance goal for these components has been achieved. However, both the NRC staff and PFS have conducted beyond-design-basis analyses of these casks and their foundations with the aim of achieving such levels of confidence. In my view, the analysts of both PFS and the staff have demonstrated (using conservative assumptions with respect to key parameters such as the friction coefficient) that under the 10⁻⁴ year return period ground motion, the casks to be used at the PFSF site will not tip over. These demonstrations are in themselves sufficient to provide good evidence that a

performance goal in the order of 10⁻⁴ has been achieved. A further determination has also been made, i.e., that no release would occur even if the casks were to tip over. This further conclusion provides still greater confidence that the annual probability of radioactive releases is less than or equal to 10⁻⁴.

Based on the above reasoning, I would answer in the negative Dr. Lam's question as to whether the "design robustness hand" is doing more than its share of heavy lifting vis a vis the "hazard level hand." My negative answer arises from the fact that we are not asking the designs to provide higher levels of performance than what they are naturally capable of providing. For example, as I have testified previously, ductile materials such as steel and reinforced concrete are capable of withstanding dynamic deformations many times larger than their nominal yield levels, and hence are also capable of withstanding ground motion amplitudes multiple times the level that causes the material to reach its nominal yield level. (This capability was recognized by the earthquake engineers when they were for the first time called upon in the 1970s to determine what the realistic seismic margins in existing nuclear power plant SSCs really are.) Thus, the "design robustness hand" is not being unduly emphasized at the expense of the "hazard level definition" hand.

Second, we must keep in mind the chronological sequence of events that have led to the current regulatory standards. Virtually all U.S. NPPs were designed based on Appendix A "deterministic" design basis ground motions and on SRPs that were intentionally more conservative than, for example, corresponding building design standards (e.g., the so-called R or force "reduction factors" in conventional building codes - such as the UBC and IBC, which have been discussed in these proceedings - were not used in the SRPs). Then, PSHA came along and showed that the Appendix A design basis ground motions had a mean return period of about 10,000 years. At about the same time, seismic PRA engineers were conducting the analyses that showed just how robust were the SSCs designed to the NPP SRP. Their conclusion was summarized in R_c ("risk reduction ratios") of 5 to 20 or more. The resulting implication that NPP SSCs achieved a performance goal of about 10-5 was a product of those studies; it was not a predefined target. Thus, the relative roles of the seismic hand and the robustness hand were not pre-selected, but resulted from the inherent beyond-design-basis capability of these components, embodied in nuclear design criteria and practices.

As we today consider the safety implications of similar SSCs in ISFSIs such as the storage casks, we are simply building on and working within the logical framework established in the past for nuclear power plant SSCs.

- Q4. Does that conclude your testimony?
 - A4. Yes.

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BY MR. GAUKLER:
Q Dr. Cornell, I would also like to ask you
a few questions with respect to Dr. Bartlett's
testimony today. If I recall correctly, I believe
that Dr. Bartlett stated his belief this morning that
the risk reduction factor of five to 20 for a typical
nuclear power plant components would not be applicable
to foundations because they would not have been part
of the seismic probability risk assessments that
underlay the development of this five to 20 factor.
Do you know whether foundations were part
of the seismic PRAs that underlay the five to 20
factor? Do you have an opinion of whether it was

appropriate to apply this five to 20 risk reduction factor to foundations?

Α Well, yes I do know that in the seismic PRAs and seismic margin studies that were of the general basis for establishing the five to 20 factor. Such as I inferred from the 6728 that as I said PRA is considered also the failure conditions associated with sliding, overturning, bearing failures. As I stated in my testimony, I'm not aware of all of the details of those.

However, I do know that those soil failure conditions or failure modes did not show up in the

seismic PRAs as being critical failure conditions.
Those were all structural and mechanical. The one
exception I can think of was in the Midland Plant
where there was a soils problem. So I infer from that
generally speaking the R (sub R) or conservatism
levels that were inferred from the seismic PRAs were
at least as large as those in the five to 20 that I
concur were adopted primarily for structural and
mechanical.
Q And therefore would also be appropriate to
imply this factor of five to 20 for the foundation
failure mechanisms that were discussed this morning;
sliding, overturing, and bearing capacity.
A Yes. I believe that evidence points in
that direction. It's part of my
Q Now again with respect to foundations, Dr.
Bartlett testified this morning I believe that one
could not establish that PFS met a performance
objective of one times ten to the minus four without
doing an analysis using the 10,000 year ground motion.
Specifically, he appeared to further state that PFS
would essentially have to undergo the same analysis
they had done before to show a factor of safety of 1.1
I guess sliding before you could establish a risk

that a correct application of the two-handed approach as you understand it?

A No. I don't believe so. We must recall that the purpose for purposes of assessing these risk reduction factors and the available margins associated with the design procedures and guidelines that apply here that one is trying to basically strip away conservatisms and check the conditions under which for example a sliding failure might occur. Therefore, a particular one would not be checking whether the safety factor ratio of capacity to demand exceeded 1.1.

One would ask simply does the capacity with respect to sliding exceed that of the value of the demand. So in a sense, one is comparing with a safety factor of 1.0 if you wish, not 1.1. That's one part of the reply. In my opinion, it's not necessary also to do an explicit 10,000 year study as was done for example to the casks and other things in many of these circumstances if by let's say approximate reasoning you can infer that we've reached at least an R (sub R) of five or so.

So for example in this case, I would first look at this capacity. What levels of conservatism apparently exist in the capacity again let us say with

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respect to sliding? In Mr. Trudeau's testimony, we heard of in his opinion the dynamic shear strength was at least a factor of one and a half greater then that of the static strength used in their calculations used for purposes of confirming adequacy with respect to the Standard Review Plan or design basis.

We also know they used lower bound strengths rather than average strengths. A variety of other such factors were used on the conservatism to induce conservatism of certainly more than a factor of one and a half on the capacity side of the problem. If I look at the demand side, I think in my mind let me see, if I consider changing from a 2000 year to something like a 10,000 year earthquake, we know from the hazard curve at this site that this would imply roughly a one and a half factor in say the PGA.

If the ground motion goes up by a factor of one and a half, how much would the initial demands that might induce sliding go up? To a first Ι believe roughly approximation, they go up proportionately. Discussion with Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Ebbeson suggest to me that if anything these demands would go up less than proportionally, that is less than a factor of one and a half if the ground motion goes up one and a half, for example, due to higher

danthing (PH) that would be associated with the higher 1 strain levels in the soil. 2 So I conclude from that if under something 3 like this 10,000 year ground motion, the realistic 4 the realistic capacity would exceed demand. 5 Concluding there would not be failure. Hence, I could 6 infer that this risk reduction factor would be if the 7 order at the order of five or so which is why I get my 8 conclusion. 9 10 So I quess I have two clarifying question. In terms of looking at the risk reduction factor and 11 12 evaluating whether a risk reduction factor exists, you're looking at realistically what you think would 13 occur without conservatisms. Correct? 14 15 Α Correct. And also with respect to the issue that 16 Dr. Bartlett brought up this morning with respect to 17 the non-linear characteristics of the soil, you 18 believe based upon your conversations with Mr. Trudeau 19 and Mr. Ebbeson that if anything that would reduce the 20 increase in the demand side of the equation. Correct? 21 22 Α It would lead to less proportional 23 increases. MR. GAUKLER: I have no further questions, 24 25 Your Honor.

1	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Thank you,
2	Mr. Gaukler. Is staff prepared or do you need a
3	minute?
4	MR. TURK: May we have just five minutes?
5	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Is that enough?
6	MR. TURK: I don't think we'll have any
7	questions. I just want to confirm that.
8	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Then let's take ten
9	minutes.
10	MR. TURK: Even less is okay for us, Your
11	Honor.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Five minutes.
13	MS. NAKAHARA: Your Honor, if you give us
14	ten, we can be ready as well.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Right. I forgot.
16	You're next. Is ten enough or do you want 15?
17	MS. NAKAHARA: No. Ten is fine.
18	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. It's 4:00 p.m.
19	We'll be back at 4:10 p.m.
20	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
21	the record at 4:00 p.m. and went back on
22	the record at 4:12 p.m.)
23	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Back on the
24	record. Has everyone gotten their thoughts organized?
25	Mr. Turk, are you ready to go ahead?

1	MR. TURK: Yes, I am. No questions.
2	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: It's too bad that that
3	awards ceremony is now. I could picture myself like
4	Dustin Hoffman in "The Graduate" coming in the back
5	and stopping the wedding. That was "The Graduate,"
6	wasn't it?
7	MS. CHANCELLOR: How about Mrs. Robinson?
8	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Let's not discuss Mrs.
9	Robinson in a Federal court room. Ms. Nakahara.
10	MS. NAKAHARA: Thank you, Your Honor. Dr.
11	Cornell
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Why don't you hold yours
13	and we'll ask a few questions and then you can think
14	those over.
15	JUDGE LAM: Perhaps that would expedite
16	things little bit.
17	MR. TURK: I hope these aren't based on my
18	questions.
19	JUDGE KLINE: Dr. Cornell, what do we gain
20	in terms of improvement in our status of knowledge by
21	comparing this process that we are in here to previous
22	reactor licensing given that the previous reactors
23	themselves went through a fairly subjective process?
24	For example it's been proffered to us that the western
25	reactors particularly including like in Diablo Canyon

are somehow probative of what we should do in this

It was never clear to me why that should be. To put it colloquially it looks like we're taking in one another's laundry here in trying to make a profit. It doesn't appear to me that we gain any information by doing that. I would like to know whether that's right or wrong.

DR. CORNELL: The consideration of what's happened in previous nuclear power plant licensing I think is done in my mind to lead us to a base or reference point that is implicit in what was admittedly a set of subjective judgements as to what a deterministic earthquake is, what levels of conservatism should be put into the standard review plan.

Implicit in that process it was deduced subsequently to the licensing process that those deterministic earthquakes had probabilities of occurrence of about 10⁻¹. The plants themselves had failure probabilities of perhaps 10⁻⁵. That represents a starting point at about what level of risk or of consequences release is associated with the nuclear power plant.

We add upon that a second step which says

by the way the consequences of failure of the ISFSI would be less severe. By a risk graded approach we may therefore increase our tolerable failure probability. In this case that is being done by the reducing the mean return of the ground motion by approximately a factor of five in terms of that. That's a reference point. That's a starting point.

SUDGE KLINE: But is it fair to say that subsequent operating experience of a nuclear power plant don't really contribute anything to our confidence that the plant was correctly licensed in the first place? For example we have cited the Diablo Canyon and Diablo Canyon went through a fair fuss during its licensing process over seismic matters. Now it's operated for 15 years or thereabouts but of course there has been no design basis earthquake out there so we have no data from Diablo Canyon to know if we did right or wrong in terms of operating experience. Do we? We don't know anymore now than we did then.

DR. CORNELL: In terms of the seismic behavior we haven't learned anything from the experience with those plants but the knowledge base and the relevant sciences is all increased.

JUDGE KLINE: Thank you.

1 JUDGE LAM: Professor Cornell, in your 2 rebuttal testimony you anticipated and answered one of the questions that I was saving for you for three 3 4 Thank you for providing that in question and 5 answer three. 6 DR. CORNELL: Ι heard that question earlier. 7 JUDGE LAM: The record before as is very 8 well developed as to your opinion on how the seismic 9 10 safety criteria should be formulated. With that as a 11 background, Professor Cornell, let me ask you to focus 12 your attention on one of the claims that the State of 13 Utah has made in this proceeding. It is that the state highway and bridges are designed to 2,500 years 14 15 return interval. If this exemption request of 2,000 year 16 17 return interval is granted then this agency is going 18 to license a nuclear facility to extend a less safer 19 than that for the highway, bridges. With the earlier 20 background that I mentioned, I would like you to tell us your opinion on that. 21 22 DR. CORNELL: My opinion is that it is an incorrect conclusion from the simple comparison of the 23 mean return periods of the design basis earthquakes. 24

One might even say is that statement made in earlier

presentations by the State's witnesses that initiated my getting involved in discussing these two hands because that's the classic example of where simply comparing the return period of the design basis earthquake gives you a false impression of what the relative safety of the comprehensive system is. That is because there are very important differences in the levels of conservatism in the criteria.

I was just looking in my answer to today's written rebuttal in answer three page four. There's a paragraph that discusses some of the conservatisms that exist in the standard review plan that has in a sense been stripped away by the UBC or IBC (building codes) which are associated with buildings but there are comparable steps made in the bridge codes.

In particular I point to this thing called the R factor. It's not the R sub R factor but just the R factor which is a reduction factor applied to the seismic forces at the structure that is a approximate way of recognizing the high levels of ductility or yield capacity, deformation capacity in ductile material such as steel or well detailed reinforced concrete. Those reduction factors can as suggested here a factor of four to six for reinforced concrete structures of the type we are interested in

1 at the PFSF. 2 So those kinds of significant reductions 3 in forces simply aren't made in the SRP. transfer into a much stronger levels of conservatism 4 and safety on the conservatism side of our two hands. 5 6 JUDGE LAM: That I understand. The report as I said is reasonably well developed as to what you 7 are saying now. But if you look at the State's claims 8 in isolatham (PH) isn't it true in a 2,500 year return 9 10 interval imposes a higher seismic standard than a 11 2,000 year return interval? DR. CORNELL: I'm having trouble with your 12 word "seismic standard." 13 JUDGE LAM: For example the loads imposed 14 15 on the structure. If I had to design a structure to withstand a 2,500 year return interval, my structure 16 17 by necessity would need to be more robust than the one that would withstand a 2,000 year return interval. 18 Isn't that true? 19 DR. CORNELL: Only if I design to the same 20 21 set of safety standards. JUDGE LAM: That's exactly what I meant. 22 How do we explain it to a public who may be relatively 23 uneducated to this two hand approach? 24

understand what you are saying on a two hand approach

about the degree and the level of conservatism. But do we have a problem here explaining ourselves as to we're assuming that one is going to be approved we're approving a seismic exemption request to a lower standard than the State of Utah's highways and bridges?

DR. CORNELL: I believe Dr. Arabasz used the word "optics" or something to that effect that the difference between 2,000 years and 2,500 years that you described might appear to or perhaps I should say surely would appear to someone without a deeper understanding of the problem as if there were some distinction.

The truth is otherwise however. I think that it's a fair question to ask how could we come up with a one sentence description that would satisfy the average reader of newspaper that you have in fact imposed much higher seismic safety criteria or have set much higher safety standards on the SSE than has been done on these bridges.

Off the top of my head I don't know what that sentence is yet. I'm waiting. But it is an interesting challenge and it's one I think we should all think about. It's the nature of this position that the engineers have put themselves into by in fact

choosing to design for ground motions which have much
lower return periods than the return period of the
event that is going to cause difficulty.

As I alluded to in previous discussions with you that it has been done mostly to simply life for the engineer. It keeps his analysis in the linear range. It keeps it where a bachelor's degree engineer can design our buildings and do so safely and without having to consider nonlinear dynamic behavior. There are a variety of cultural reasons why this is true. I don't think it will change quickly.

JUDGE LAM: Thank you, Dr. Cornell. I appreciate your comments.

CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Let me follow up. If I understand some of the earlier testimony in the case that there is sort of a claim by the company that their design actually goes way beyond or what would be required at 2,000 or 2,500. In fact I think once I may have asked them are you claiming that it meets the 10,000 year return earthquake. If I'm right about the general nature of that testimony and please tell me if I'm not why isn't the answer to the one line newspaper sentence that's hard to write just saying let's up it to 2,500 because we're already there. Does that question make any sense to you?

1 DR. CORNELL: Yes, I believe it does. 2,500 there would 2 to up it to you were be 3 consequences. Economic consequences to be sure and a 4 reanalysis if nothing else and one would have to again 5 demonstrate that you've met the standard review plan. 6 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: There might not be 7 structural consequences. 8 DR. CORNELL: I can't speak to that. Ιt 9 depends on how close individual elements in the plant are to the existing margin with respect to meeting 10 standard review plan design basis. What has been said 11 by the Applicant and I support that is that given that 12 13 we have design to the standard review plan with a 2,000 year design basis we believe that under the 14 15 10,000 year earthquake there would not be release of 16 radioactivity. 17 Maybe the way to state the sentence is to 18 focus not so much on the 2,000 year design basis number but focus on the number for which we and 19 20 hopefully Your Honors are comfortable that under such an earthquake 10,000 years we don't believe there 21 would be release of radioactivity and bypass the 22 engineers conventions that confuse us all. 23 JUDGE LAM: You said it well, Dr. Cornell. 24 If your theory prevails this is indeed an optics 25

1	problem.
2	DR. CORNELL: I should say again and I
3	believe I said it earlier many of us in the earthquake
4	engineering world are aware of this problem and we are
5	moving to change it. There is a new set of design
6	criteria for steel buildings, those that caused the
7	difficulty in earthquakes in Kobe and North Ridge in
8	the middle '90s.
9	The new criteria that have been developed
10	for those structures do indeed set the design basis
11	earthquake at the probability level of failure that we
12	are trying to obtain. So we are moving in that
13	direction. We hope that it will be something that all
14	the engineers move towards in the future.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Thank you, Dr. Cornell.
16	I think that concludes the Board's questions. Go
17	ahead, Ms. Nakahara.
18	MS. NAKAHARA: Thank you, Your Honor.
19	CROSS EXAMINATION
20	BY MS. NAKAHARA:
21	Q Dr. Cornell, earlier you testified that
22	various PRAs, seismic PRAs conducted for nuclear power
23	plants considered the failure of sliding and
24	overturning. Is that correct?
25	A Yes I did.

1	Q Were any of these PRAs conducted at a site
2	where the foundation is supported by cement treated
3	soil?
4	A Not to my knowledge.
5	Q Are any of these sites supported by a
6	silty clay, clay silt layer?
7	A I don't know. I can't answer that
8	question.
9	Q And do any of these sites employ sliding
10	as a mechanism to reduce seismic demand?
11	A Not to my knowledge other than perhaps wet
12	fuel storage perhaps sliding is permitted but perhaps
13	not to It would be considered in a PRA if that were
14	at issue.
15	Q At what facility? I'm sorry.
16	A Elements within wet storage are free to
17	move to some degree.
18	Q Has any of your prefiled or oral testimony
19	in this proceeding that you have given earlier
20	changed?
21	A No.
22	MS. NAKAHARA: I have no further
23	questions, Your Honor. But we do have a one question
24	rebuttal of Dr. Cornell for Dr. Bartlett.
25	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Wait. We will give you

a moment if you want to think about our questions that 1 2 changes your plan or thoughts. Okay. MR. TURK: I have some follow on to Your 3 4 Honors' questions. Just a limited amount. 5 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Since you passed last time around we will let you take your turn now. 6 7 MR. TURK: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 CROSS EXAMINATION (con't) 9 BY MR. TURK: 10 0 Judge Kline asked you a question. I should say again good afternoon to you, Dr. Cornell. 11 12 Α Good afternoon, Mr. Turk. There were a series of very thoughtful 13 0 questions from the judges. I want to ask a few follow 14 on questions to some of those. First Judge Kline 15 asked you about the licensing of other nuclear power 16 17 plants such as Diablo Canyon. As I understood the question he asked what do we gain by referring back to 18 those nuclear power plants. As I understood the 19 20 question it was as a fact that that plant may have been licensed initially give us confidence here 21 because there was a question as to whether it was 22 licensed properly in the first place or was it a 23 subjective judgement. My question to you would be is 24 it fair to say that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 25

1	is aware of the fact that it licensed the facility and
2	allows it to continue to operate recognizing the
3	design earthquake that was accepted for that facility.
4	A May I try to restate the question?
5	Q Did you learn something from the fact that
6	the Commission allows the plant to continue to operate
7	with the design basis earthquake in place as the
8	standard for that facility?
9	A Yes, we learned that the new information
10	that has come along about earthquakes and the behavior
11	of structures under earthquakes has not changed the
12	NRC's opinion as to the adequacy of the safety of that
13	plant. Perhaps it's improved it.
14	JUDGE KLINE: I just want to make clear
15	that my questions do not challenge the licensing basis
16	for Diablo Canyon. (Laughter.) We don't want to go
17	there. I only mean to inquire does comparison to
18	Diablo Canyon yield anything problemative vis à vis
19	PFS. That's what I explored.
20	MR. TURK: Yes, I'm exploring it a little
21	bit further the fact that it's continued to allow to
22	operate must indicate that there's some satisfaction
23	that the operation is safe.
24	JUDGE KLINE: I just don't want to stumble
25	into the wrong territory.

1	MR. TURK: No. They will call us out
2	there for the next Diablo Canyon hearing which I
3	understand is gearing up.
4	JUDGE LAM: And Judge Kline and I are
5	sitting on the licensing board. (Laughter.)
6	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: They didn't invite me.
7	I must have done something wrong.
8	DR. CORNELL: They're saving you for Yucca
9	Mountain. (Laughter.)
10	BY MR. TURK:
11	Q They're saving all of us for that. Judge
12	Lam asked you some questions about designing a
13	facility here to a 2,000 year design basis earthquake
14	level and comparing that to the fact that there may be
15	public perception that highways are built to a higher
16	standard of 2,500 years.
17	Here is my understanding of your answer.
18	The comparison of the 2,000 year earthquake that the
19	staff has proposed and accepted and that PFS has
20	proposed here uses one set of design criteria. As I
21	understand your answer the criteria for the highways
22	under the 2,500 year return ground motion are
23	different. Correct?
24	A Yes, much more liberal.
25	Q Okay. And therefore your conclusion is

1	designing to the 2,000 year earthquake under Nuclear
2	Regulatory Commission guidance is not the equivalent
3	and in fact would exceed designing to a highway
4	standard of 2,500 year return period earthquake.
5	A Yes, that was my answer and Judge Lam told
6	me he seemed to understood all of that. It was back
7	to the perception question that we needed to consider
8	more.
9	Q Let me ask you one more question about
10	perception. If the commission was to say to the
11	public we will license this facility at a 2,500 year
12	earthquake and draw an analogy to the fact that
13	highways in Utah may be designed to a 2,500 year
14	earthquake wouldn't you still have the same perception
15	problem where the public might say why shouldn't a
16	nuclear facility be safer or built to a higher
17	standard than a highway?
18	A You would have a perception problem but a
19	little more subtle one perhaps.
20	Q Merely adopting that standard wouldn't get
21	you necessarily anything much in the way of public
22	perception. Correct?
23	A Correct, because it seems to me that the
24	intelligent reader of this newspaper would say ah but
25	we should in fact be holding the ISFSI to a somewhat

1	higher standards with respect to failure.
2	Q And perhaps one of the answers in terms of
3	explanations of the optics as Dr. Arabasz used the
4	term would be to explain that highway failure could
5	result in death of the traveling public whereas
6	tipover of a cask would not lead to release or public
7	safety and health consequences. Would that be part of
8	the explanation that would explain the return period
9	selection?
10	A I don't want to put words into Dr.
11	Arabasz's mouth but in my judgement that's probably
12	not the way that would perceive the two problems.
13	Correct as it might be.
14	Q Is it your understanding the PFS has
15	stated that they are already designed to a 2,500 year
16	earthquake? Or I believe that Judge Farrer asked you
17	a question which suggested that he had heard testimony
18	to that effect. Did you understand that PFS is
19	claiming that they have designed to a 2,500 year
20	earthquake level?
21	A No. Could you restate that?
22	Q Yes. I just want to be sure that we have
23	a correct understanding.
24	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Mr. Turk, you mean by
25	that question a formal claim as opposed to what I

1	thought I heard in an informal claim. Would that help
2	state the question?
3	MR. TURK: Yes. Just so the record is
4	clear PFS does not claim formally that it has designed
5	this facility to a 2,500 year ground motion. Correct?
6	DR. CORNELL: No it has not.
7	MR. TURK: I have nothing further. I
8	thank you.
9	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Thank you, Mr. Turk.
10	Applicant?
11	MR. GAUKLER: No questions.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right.
13	MS. NAKAHARA: Your Honor, I have one
14	followup to Mr. Turk for Dr. Cornell.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Certainly.
16	CROSS EXAMINATION (Con'd)
17	BY MS. NAKAHARA:
18	Q Dr. Cornell, Mr. Turk asked you a question
19	relating to the fact that the NRC continues to allow
20	Diablo Canyon to operate and said the design basis
21	earthquake is adequate or something to that effect.
22	Do you recall that question?
23	A Yes.
24	Q Isn't it true that the design basis
25	earthquake at licensing Diablo Canyon has changed to

1	current knowledge of what the seismic hazard is at the
2	facility?
3	A You are asking me about details of the
4	Diablo Canyon situation.
5	Q Yes.
6	A I was 20 years ago involved in that
7	problem. I'm not sure exactly what the current state
8	is. So I'm not sure I want to respond to that.
9	Q Isn't it true that the ground motions
10	originally estimated for Diablo Canyon when the
11	facility was licensed have increased based on new
12	knowledge?
13	A There is a so-called Hasgri question that
14	led to a reevaluation of the seismic conditions at
15	Diablo Canyon. To the best of my knowledge there was
16	not a change in the design basis earthquake.
17	MS. NAKAHARA: Thank you. I have no
18	further questions.
19	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Dr. Cornell,
20	thank you again. You have the Board's gratitude for
21	your testimony and the manner in which you explained
22	things. Thank you.
23	DR. CORNELL: You're welcome. Thank you,
24	Your Honor.
25	(Witness excused.)

1	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: State wants Dr. Barlett
2	on rebuttal.
3	MS. NAKAHARA: Yes, Your Honor.
4	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
5	MS. NAKAHARA: Just very briefly.
6	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Dr. Bartlett, don't make
7	me take back those nice things I said about you.
8	DR. BARLETT: No more than five minutes.
9	REBUTTAL EXAMINATION
10	BY MS. NAKAHARA:
11	Q Dr. Barlett, do you recall Dr. Cornell's
12	testimony regarding his discussions with Mr. Trudeau
13	about the additional margins with respect to the
14	dynamic shear strength versus the static shear
15	strength of the soils?
16	A Yes, I'm familiar with that issue.
17	Q And do you agree with Dr. Cornell's
18	characterization of Mr. Trudeau's conservatism in
19	using static shear strength versus dynamic shear
20	strength?
21	A I think Dr. Cornell correctly stated that
22	PFS's position is that there is increased strength
23	capacity to the dynamic effect. We disagree with the
24	amount of conservatisms that is implied. The
25	Applicant is implying an additional 50 to 100 percent

increase in dynamic strength. 1 2 The State's position is as stated in my surrebuttal to Mr. Trudeau that the effect is not as 3 4 large as claimed and certainly any effect of that 5 order of increase should be demonstrated by site 6 specific testing which has not been done at PFS site. And do you recall the question that Mr. 7 Turk asked Dr. Cornell regarding the design basis 8 9 earthquake for highway bridges? Yes, I do. 10 Α What is the design criteria for bridges in 11 0 Utah? 12 The design basis earthquake is a 2,500 13 Α year return period event. UDOT's philosophy at least 14 15 interstate bridges and it only applies to interstate bridges not all bridges designed in Utah 16 17 that these are lifelines. These particular bridges must be able to survive a 2,500 year return period 18 event with essentially no structural damage. 19 Then Mr. Turk asked Dr. Cornell a question 20 Q regarding public perception on where death could occur 21 22 on a highway bridge versus what could occur at a PFS Isn't it true that if a cask tipped over a 23 site. 360,000 pound cask could kill someone? 24 It certainly could crush somebody. 25

1	MS. NAKAHARA: I have no further
2	questions, Your Honor.
3	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Any cross by the
4	company?
5	MR. TURK: Dr. Bartlett has the last word.
6	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Mr. Turk?
7	MR. TURK: I have one question not related
8	to the rebuttal. But it relates to my correction that
9	I made earlier. Just so the record is complete if I
10	may be permitted to ask that question about the ANSI
11	standard.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
13	MR. TURK: That question would be is there
14	anything about the ANSI/ANS 57.9 standard that you
15	believe is less conservative than regulatory guidance
16	for nuclear power plants?
17	DR. BARLETT: No.
18	MR. TURK: Thank you.
19	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: I think we are done.
20	Ms. Chancellor, please restrain yourself.
21	MR. GAUKLER: Connie, Ms. Nakahara and I
22	have conferred before we started this and we had this
23	idea that maybe deferring Dr. Cornell until next
24	Wednesday just to keep him around. We decided that it
25	would mean. To Dr. Cornell and Dr. Bartlett but we

1	deferred to that. (Laughter.)
2	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: I think after
3	approximately five and half weeks in various locations
4	in Salt Lake City and in our hearing room we have
5	finally completed the 21 witnesses with direct
6	testimony and probably in equal or greater number of
7	rebuttal and surbuttal witnesses.
8	MS. NAKAHARA: Your Honor, not to dampen
9	the festivities. Ms. Braxton reminds me I need to ask
10	a clarification question.
11	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
12	MS. NAKAHARA: It's not clear to us
13	whether State's Exhibit 173 was admitted and we have
14	a reference in the transcript to 59.57 on April 30.
15	MR. GAUKLER: What is stated
16	MS. NAKAHARA: I'm sorry. It's Holtec
17	Multi-cask response that PFS is FSEI from 2,000 year
18	seismic event.
19	MR. GAUKLER: Revision 2.
20	MS. NAKAHARA: Revision 2.
21	MR. GAUKLER: I thought it was admitted.
22	We have no objection to its admission.
23	MS. NAKAHARA: It's proprietary.
24	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Melissa tells me it was
25	entered on page 6130. But whether or not it was since

there is no objection we will readmit if we didn't do 1 2 that. document 3 (The referred having to 4 previously been marked for identification as State's Exhibit 173, was received into 5 evidence.) 6 7 MR. GAUKLER: Page 6130. 8 CHAIRMAN FARRAR: 6130 it was. 9 MS. NAKAHARA: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. TURK: I would simply note my copy of 10 11 the document is marked proprietary. Let's check to see if it's marked. 12 13 MR. GAUKLER: It is proprietary. That's one of the two Holtec proprietary documents that are 14 15 part of the record. We agree that we are going to way in terms of the documents 16 them that 17 themselves being proprietary and would not be make part of the public record all be it the transcript 18 discussion of those documents would be made part of 19 20 the public. CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. 21 We will at 22 some point down the road we'll make sure we sort out 23 as we are writing our opinion and you're writing your briefs will be probably come up with things that need 24 reconciled and we can enter a single order 25

1	somewhere along the line making sure that all those
2	things are straighten out.
3	MR. TURK: Could I ask while we're on the
4	subject that Mr. Gaukler identify which document is
5	the other one that's proprietary? Just so we have it
6	in one place so we can recall it.
7	MR. GAUKLER: Wait until my paralegal
8	brings me my book of exhibits and I'll tell you.
9	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: While they are doing
10	that, Ms. Nakahara, you will be here with Mr. Soper.
11	MS. NAKAHARA: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Ms. Chancellor, I first
13	met you on that screen over there at a prehearing
14	conference. It seems like a long time ago.
15	MS. CHANCELLOR: It was.
16	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: It was January probably.
17	You will not be back.
18	MS. CHANCELLOR: Absolutely not. Dr.
19	Bartlett and I are heading west.
20	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Mr. Gaukler, you will
21	here with Mr. Soper.
22	MR. GAUKLER: Mr. Soper and Mr. Barnett,
23	yes.
24	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: We will miss your
25	colleagues. Mr. Turk, Ms. Marco will have

1	MR. TURK: She will have my company.
2	Hopefully not my voice.
3	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: All right. Mr. O'Neill,
4	you I understand if I recall correctly have been
5	escaping a detail somewhere else. I'm sure it won't
6	be as much fun as here but we've appreciated having
7	you with us.
8	MR. O'NEILL: Thank you.
9	MR. GAUKLER: The other exhibits were the
10	various different versions of PFS Exhibit 86. I think
11	there was an 86, 86A and 86C but they are all entitled
12	PFSF Beyond Design Basis Scope Reanalysis for the
13	product storage facility. They are different versions
14	of that document that were introduced as under the
15	label of PFS Exhibit 86.
16	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
17	MR. GAUKLER: One small housekeeping
18	matter, Your Honor. Monday as part of our rebuttal
19	testimony we may want to tie in Mr. Vigeant by phone
20	for just a brief period of time.
21	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: He's a meteorologist.
22	MR. GAUKLER: Yes.
23	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
24	MR. GAUKLER: We don't need him here for
25	the entire time but for part of the testimony to have

1	him tied in.
2	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: What about the 50 or so
3	exhibits? Did we introduce those?
4	MR. GAUKLER: No, we did not. We
5	premarked them so they are all marked.
6	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: How can we do that
7	without wasting a whole lot of time Monday morning?
8	MR. GAUKLER: They are all premarked with
9	exhibit numbers.
10	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: And everybody had them?
11	MR. GAUKLER: Everybody has them. In
12	other words, what we did is we marked them with
13	exhibit numbers and then we made the copies so
14	everybody should have the same documents with the same
15	exhibit numbers on them. I would suggest that we just
16	go with those exhibit numbers.
17	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: You don't have to stand
18	around and distribute all of them. We can probably
19	avoid describing each one. There are crash reports
20	numbered such and such.
21	MR. GAUKLER: And we have the index as
22	well. We could make that a separate exhibit.
23	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Right. And what about
24	the court reporter? Do you have separate set for the
25	court reporter?

1	MR. GAUKLER: Yes. I just would confer
2	with Mr. Barnett because he's been handling that.
3	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Let's do it in a simple
4	fashion where you just dump them all in. We all have
5	them and we can march along and deal with the
6	substance rather than describing them.
7	MR. TURK: Could we discuss maybe for Ms.
8	Marco's benefit what is the order of events starting
9	on Monday? Which panel would be going first?
10	MR. GAUKLER: What will happen on Monday
11	is that we will have the rest of our rebuttal
12	testimony which will consist of General Cole, General
13	Jefferson and Colonel Fry.
14	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Now they had taken the
15	stand in rebuttal.
16	MR. GAUKLER: Right.
17	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: They had talked about
18	the exhibits. We had said fine. We would argue about
19	them. We said fine let them in but give the other
20	side time to deal with them. But did they provide
21	other testimony?
22	MR. GAUKLER: They had provided us some
23	other testimony and there was some other rebuttal
24	testimony we were going to provide. We had roughly a
25	third through our rebuttal testimony if you recall

1	when this issue came up. So once the issue came up it
2	didn't make sense to run late to get the rest of the
3	rebuttal testimony when we couldn't get that in any
4	event.
5	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Well, that's all oral
6	rebuttal.
7	MR. GAUKLER: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: So no one at this point
9	has filed written rebuttal.
10	MR. GAUKLER: That's correct. Then we
11	will be done Monday morning with that. At some point
12	in time in this process of rebuttal we would probably
13	want to tie Mr. Vigeant in by phone to include him.
14	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: You're going to present
15	the reports. Are they going to go through each one
16	and say here's what they can do for each one?
17	MR. GAUKLER: We weren't planning on doing
18	that, no.
19	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay.
20	MR. GAUKLER: We could do that if you
21	want.
22	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: No.
23	MR. GAUKLER: But my understanding from
24	talking with Mr. Barnett, that right now we don't
25	plant on doing that.

1	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: So then you will be
2	finished with them when?
3	MR. GAUKLER: I would say approximately
4	lunch time if not before.
5	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Then you tie in
6	Mr. Vigeant.
7	MR. GAUKLER: At some point in time that
8	made sense to tie him in.
9	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Same way we did Dr.
10	Arabasz.
11	MR. GAUKLER: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: And that's the end of
13	your rebuttal.
14	MR. GAUKLER: Yes.
15	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Mr. Turk, can you speak
16	for Ms. Marco?
17	MR. TURK: Not entirely but I recall when
18	we broke last time we were planning to put on one of
19	our witnesses with a small piece of rebuttal. But I
20	have been out of that loop for some time. I couldn't
21	speak for her. I assume if we did it would be under
22	a half hour.
23	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: But now the State will
24	have a lot of cross examination of the military panel
25	I assume.

1	MS. NAKAHARA: Yes, Your Honor. I
2	wouldn't characterize it as a lot but we will have
3	probably more rebuttal with Colonel Horstman.
4	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Talking about the
5	reports.
6	MS. NAKAHARA: Yes.
7	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: But he will have nothing
8	in writing.
9	MS. NAKAHARA: No, Your Honor.
10	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: That's all.
11	MS. NAKAHARA: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Okay. Sounds good.
13	JUDGE LAM: So are we still planning on
14	three days of hearing?
15	MS. NAKAHARA: I think so.
16	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Our target is noon on
17	Wednesday.
18	MR. GAUKLER: By noon on Wednesday
19	Hopefully we will be in a situation like this week
20	where we get done early but I think since we don't
21	know exactly what our rebuttal is.
22	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Right and we will make
23	an effort for those who are traveling. Noon on
24	Wednesday is a lot better than 7:00 p.m. on Wednesday.
25	So we will shoot for noon. There is no sense not

finishing.

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MR. TURK: What are start times Monday? 9:00 a.m.?

CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Nine and we'll do our nine to five thing basically all three days. I think I've indicated something along these lines before but I may expand on it. I never understood the Patty Hearst or the hostage syndrome how you could become friends with the people who were holding you captive and think they were your best friends.

By the time we finish here we will have spent essentially a calendar quarter 13 weeks, nine weeks of those 13 in hearings and I think there has been a good learning curve on everybody's part and if not a life long bond certainly a mutual respect among the lawyers and counsel and the Board and visa versa. I think among the various counsel too. So it's been good experience. Apart from the substantive decision in the case I think we all can try to take some learning from it that maybe we can incorporate into future cases and make them go more smoothly and more quickly. Maybe you have to have this learning But it's been a excellent curve in every case. delightful experience working with all of you. hope to be able to say the same about your colleagues

1	in the aircraft matter on Wednesday.
2	So if there are no other matters we'll
3	make have a little party right down here with the
4	water that is allowed to be in the courtroom.
5	(Laughter.) Judge Bollwark runs a tight ship in the
6	courtroom in not being able to bring in any food and
7	drink. But thank you all.
8	MS. CHANCELLOR: Your Honor, I would just
9	like to thank you for the way you've conducted the
10	proceeding.
11	CHAIRMAN FARRAR: Thank you, Ms.
12	Chancellor. Off the record.
13	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
14	concluded at 4:58 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Private Fuel Storage, LLC

Docket Number: Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI

ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI

Location: Rockville, Maryland

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Rébecca Davis

Official Reporter

Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.